


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EGYPT: New manifestations of student restiveness pose another troublesome problem for President Sadat.

Three instances of modest student unrest at two Egyptian universities have occurred in Cairo since 28 October. Two of the demonstrations apparently involved Palestinian and university issues, but during the third--which involved only Egyptian students--both Sadat and Prime Minister Sidqi were criticized for failing to develop meaningful national policies.

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Egyptian authorities say they believe that conservative Muslim Brotherhood elements--perennial bugbears of the Nasir regime--were primarily responsible for the anti-regime disturbances.

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The Sadat regime was troubled by a wave of student violence in January that it successfully quelled with a combination of force and conciliation. The government is anxious to avoid another such embarrassment. Rumors of student restiveness were circulating in September and the opening of the universities was delayed some two weeks. Two days before the beginning of classes the government announced plans to improve student housing and services and to increase the civil service pay scale.

Student grievances now are much the same as they were in January. There is uneasiness over the lack of direction in the Sadat regime and the credibility of the leadership is low. There is concern about Egypt's future relationship with the Soviet Union and continuing unhappiness with the poor state of the economy. Many of these student concerns are shared by other Egyptians and will probably intensify in the absence of some sign of firmer leadership from Sadat and his associates.

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USSR-SUDAN: Soviet gestures may have stimulated some progress toward the normalization of diplomatic relations between Khartoum and Moscow.

Soviet efforts to improve relations with Sudan--rebuffed earlier in the year--may have been more successful since Foreign Minister Gromyko met with his Sudanese counterpart in late September.

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The meeting may have set the stage for Sudanese President Numayri to retreat from his demand that Moscow publicly denounce the coup attempt before relations could be restored. In an interview published in a Lebanese newspaper on 26 October, Numayri said he would consider economic aid and foreign policy support as an "indirect denunciation" of the coup.

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On 28 October one Western wire service announced that the Sudanese and Soviets had agreed to resume diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level, but this report has not been confirmed in either capital. There is little doubt, however, that Moscow has good reason to keep trying. The Soviets have been seeking to improve their position throughout the Arab world since their expulsion from Egypt. They are also interested in upgrading their presence

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in Khartoum in order to gain equal status with the representatives of the other major powers there. The Sudanese, in turn, would welcome some outside support for their pursuit of an increasingly independent foreign policy.

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